Central Bank Independence and Budget Deficits in Developing Countries: New Evidence from Panel Data Analysis by Yannick Lucotte
Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orléans – UMR CNRS 6221 Faculté de Droit, d'Economie et de Gestion, 
Rue de Blois, B.P. 6739 – 45067 Orléans Cedex 2 - France 
Tél : 33 (0)2 38 41 70 37 – 33 (0)2 38 49 48 19 – Fax : 33 (0)2 38 41 73 80 
















« Central Bank Independence and Budget Deficits in 
Developing Countries: New Evidence  
















Central Bank Independence and Budget Deficits in Developing Countries: New 




Résumé : Au cours des vingt dernières années, de nombreux pays ont révisé profondément 
les  statuts  régissant  le  fonctionnement  et  les  missions  de  leurs  banques  centrales  afin  de 
conférer à ces dernières une plus grande indépendance vis-à-vis du pouvoir politique. Cette 
évolution  concerna  plusieurs  pays,  aussi  bien  d￩velopp￩s  qu’en  d￩veloppement,  et  est 
conforme  à  la  th￩orie  de  l’incoh￩rence  temporelle  de  la  politique  monétaire  de  Barro  et 
Gordon,  qui  met  en  avant  l’importance  de  l’ind￩pendance  de  l’autorit￩  mon￩taire  pour 
l’acquisition d’une cr￩dibilit￩ anti-inflationniste. En outre, le statut de la banque centrale peut 
également affecter la conduite de la politique budgétaire. La littérature théorique montre en 
effet qu’une forte ind￩pendance incite le gouvernement à davantage de discipline budgétaire, 
et inversement. Cependant, le peu d’￩tudes empiriques consacrées à cette question concernent 
essentiellement des pays développés et ont abouti à des résultats économétriques décevants. 
Afin de combler cette lacune, nous analysons la mani￨re dont le degr￩ d’ind￩pendance de la 
banque centrale influence le niveau de déficit budgétaire pour un large échantillon de pays en 
développement  sur  la  période  1995-2004,  en  nous  appuyant  sur  deux  indicateurs 
d’ind￩pendance  développés  par  la  littérature.  Les  résultats  des  estimations  indiquent  une 
relation négative entre degr￩ d’ind￩pendance et niveau de d￩ficit budg￩taire.    
 
Abstract : Over the past two decades, many countries have passed legislation giving more 
independence  to  their  central  banks.  This  institutional  evolution  has  concerned  several 
developed  countries  but  also  developing  countries  and,  is  consistent  with  the  Barro  and 
Gordon’s theory of time-inconsistent monetary policy, which emphasizes the importance of 
independence  in  terms  of  acquiring  anti-inflationary  credibility.  But,  central  bank 
independence (CBI) could also affect the design of fiscal policy. Indeed, theoretical literature 
shows  that  a  greater  degree  of  independence  influences  government  to  fiscal  discipline; 
conversely, a weak degree of independence may influence the government to pursue lax fiscal 
policy. However, the few empirical studies that attempted to assess the relation between CBI 
and budget deficits principally focused on industrial countries and provided disappointing 
econometric  results.  This  paper  seeks  to  address  this  gap  in  the  literature  by  providing 
empirical analysis of the influence of CBI on budget deficits in a large set of developing 
countries over the 1995-2004 period. Using a panel data analysis and two indicators of CBI, 
the results show a negative relationship between CBI and budget deficits.  
Keywords : Central bank independence, Budget balances, Developing countries, Panel data 
analysis  
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1.  Introduction 
During  the  last  two  decades,  many  countries  have  deeply  reformed  their  central  banks’ 
legislation in order to confer them greater independence and, to define clearly their primary 
objective: maintaining price stability. Indeed, it is often argued that a high degree of central 
bank independence (hereafter CBI) coupled with an explicit mandate that the central bank aim 
for price stability are essential for maintaining that stability. During 1989-1996, Cukierman 
(1996) shows that these legislative reforms concern 25 countries, both industrial and emerging 
or developing countries, particularly Latin American. According to Cukierman and Webb 
(1995), these  countries  have increased the independence of their monetary  authorities for 
various reasons (economic, political, and historical). 
Why the central bank should be independent? The traditional origin of theoretical studies on 
CBI and the governor’s degree of conservatism is the time-inconsistency problem of political 
choices (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). According to this concept of time-inconsistency, an ex 
ante  optimal  policy  can  prove  no  optimal  ex  post,  the  government  reserved  the  right  to 
“cheat”  without  respecting  the  announced  policy.  Applied  to  monetary  policy  (Barro  and 
Gordon  [1983a,  1983b],  Backus  and  Drifill  [1985]),  the  direct  consequence  of  the  time-
inconsistency problem is the loss of credibility of central banks and an inflationary bias of 
discretionary  monetary  policy.  One  of  the  solutions  to  this  problem  is  to  appoint  a 
conservative central bank governor, in the sense that he places a greater weight on price 
stability than the government does (Rogoff, 1985). In practice, CBI could be a manner of 
appointing  a  conservative  central  banker.  Furthermore,  concerning  this  time-inconsistency 
problem,  recent  studies  have  suggested  that  CBI  could  allow  the  protection  of  monetary 
policy against partisan electoral cycles (Alesina, 1988; Alesina et al., 1997) and therefore not 
to divert the monetary policy from its primary objective. So the principal message of these 
theories  is  that  government  suffers  from  an  inflationary  bias  and  that,  it  is  necessary  to 
depoliticize monetary policy (i.e. increase the CBI) in order to fight more efficiently against 
inflation. 
The idea that an independent central bank is associated with lower inflation was supported by 
an important empirical literature which suggests that average inflation is negatively related to 3 
 
the  CBI  degree
2. However, the majority of these empirical studies are done for OECD 
countries and, when developing countries are included in the sample, results are very weak 
and sensitive to the indicator of CBI used. Indeed , most empirical studies used an indicator 
based on central bank laws in place (de jure independence) but, a legal approach is not fit for 
developing countries. Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992, pp. 361-363) argue that “the 
legal  status  of  a  central  bank  is  only  one  of  several  elements  that  determine  its  actual 
independence. Many central banks laws are highly incomplete and leave a lot of room of 
interpretation. As a result, factors such as tradition or the personalities of the governor and 
other high officials of the bank at least partially shape the actual level of CBI. Even when the 
law is quite explicit, reality may be very different”. Thus, according to Fuhrer (1997, p. 27), 
“legal  CBI  could  be  very  different  from  actual  CBI  in  countries  where  the  practice  of 
monetary policy deviates from the letter of the law. Measures of legal CBI should thus be 
viewed as (possibly noisy) indicators of underlying CBI”. For this reason, Cukierman et al. 
(1992) and Cukierman and Webb (1995) have developed de facto indicators of CBI, more 
adequate  than  de  jure  indicators  when  studying  the  CBI  in  developing  and  emerging 
countries. So in this paper two complementary approaches to assess CBI are proposed: one 
legal with the Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) index (hereafter CWN), the most widely 
employed  legal  indicator  of  CBI  in  the  empirical  literature  and,  one  behavioral  with  the 
turnover rate of central bank governors (hereafter TOR). 
Moreover, the theoretical literature (Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1987; Castellani and Debrun, 
2001; Montiel, 2003) shows that CBI should affect the design of fiscal policy, i.e. a greater 
degree of independence influences the central government to fiscal discipline; inversely, a 
weak independence could influence the government to fiscal laxity. This view is associated 
with  the  question  of  sources  of  financing  for  government  deficit.  The  adoption  of  an 
independent central bank deprives the government from inflation tax and so constitutes a 
strong  signal  for  fiscal  discipline.  According  to  Mankiw  (1987),  inflation  is  a  source  of 
revenue and must be considered as a part of the global budgetary policy. Indeed, as debt and 
interest rates are measured in nominal terms (i.e. the interest rates are not indexed on inflation 
rate),  generating  inflation  depreciates  the  real  value  of  intern  public  debt  and  interest 
payments. Masciandaro and Tabellini (1987, p. 133) conclude that “the crucial determinant of 
fiscal  policy is  the monetary regime, that is,  the link between  current  deficits  and future 
monetization”. 
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However, despite the voluminous literature on CBI, the majority of empirical studies on CBI 
are  focused  on  the  relationship  between  CBI  and  inflation.  There  has  been  few  positive 
analysis of the relationship between CBI and budget deficits. To the best of our knowledge, 
seven empirical studies have investigated the relationship between the CBI degree and the 
level of budget deficits
3. But, quantitative analysis (statistic/econometric strategy) of these 
studies are open to criticism and, results are am biguous or even not statistically significant. 
Besides, only Sikken and De Haan (1998) have addressed this issue for developing countries. 
Using three indicators of CBI (de jure and de facto) developed in the literature, these authors 
refute the theoretical results and, conclude that there is no relationship between CBI and the 
level of budget deficits during 1972-89 period on the sample of 30 developing countries. 
Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to assess econometrically the influence of CBI on the 
level of government budget deficits in developing countries. The econometric analysis uses 
panel data and focuses on a large set of developing countries during 1995-2004 period. The 
results show a negative relationship between de facto CBI and government primary budget 
surplus. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the concept of CBI, 
while  section  3  presents  CBI  measures  used  in  this  study.  Section  4  introduces  the 
econometric  analysis  and  data.  Section  5  provides  and  discusses  results.  The  last  section 
concludes and gives some policy implications derived from the empirical findings. 
 
2.  What is independence? 
Generally speaking, independence means that, abstracting from exceptional circumstances, 
nobody can interfere in the decisions made by the central bank in the exercise of its functions 
or, reverse the course of its decisions (Patat, 2003). 
More precisely, CBI refers to three areas where the influence of government must be either 
excluded  or  drastically  curtailed  (Hasse,  1990):  organic,  functional  and  financial 
independence.  
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Organic  independence  relates  to  the  conditions  under  which  central  bank  executives  are 
appointed, the term and the renewal of their mandates (in particular of the governor), as well 
as the composition of the central bank’s governing bodies, i.e. if government representatives 
have  (or  not)  the  right  to  sit  and  vote  within  these  authorities.  However,  Bassoni  and 
Cartapanis  (1995)  underline  that  recent  studies  have  focused  on  real  term  of  governors’ 
mandates (TOR) and, on the degree of synchronization between the mandates of central bank 
governor and of chief of executive power.   
Functional independence (or operational independence) refers to the effective freedom the 
central bank enjoys, not only in the definition of objectives to pursue, but also in the conduct 
of monetary policy, which includes the choice of instruments. According to Henning (1994), 
independence refers to the ability of the central bank to use the instruments of monetary 
control  without  instruction,  guidance  or  interference  from  the  government.  Thus,  some 
authors  subdivide  the  functional  independence  and  make  a  difference  between:  (i)  goal 
independence,  (ii)  target  independence  and  (iii)  instrument  independence.  The  difference 
between  these  three  levels  of  independence  is  nevertheless  subtle  and  so  requires  to  be 
clarified, especially for the two first levels
4. 
(i)  Goal independence imparts to the central bank to determine the monetary policy 
and exchange rate regime, or simply the monetary policy in the case of a floating 
exchange rate. More precisely, goal independence gives to the emission institute 
the authority to determine its primary objective among several objectives included 
in the central bank law or, less frequently, to determine its primary objective if the 
law doesn’t clearly define the objectives. 
(ii)  Target  independence,  as  the  precedent  form  of  independence,  entrusts  the 
monetary authority with the responsibility of determining the monetary policy and 
exchange  rate  regime,  or  simply  the  monetary  policy  if  the  exchange  rate  is 
floating. However, target independence differs from goal independence because 
the  primary  objective  that  the  central  bank  must  pursue  through  its  monetary 
policy is clearly defined in the law. So, the central bank has an absolute autonomy 
in  the  choice  of  specific  target  (monetary  base,  interest  rate,  inflation  rate)  to 
pursue its legislative objective(s), such as price stability. 
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(iii)  Instrument independence means that the government or the legislature defines the 
monetary policy and its objectives, in accordance with the central bank and the 
exchange rate regime. However, the monetary authority keeps sufficient autonomy 
to implement this policy using the appropriate instruments.  
According  to  Debelle  and  Fischer  (1994),  a  central  bank  should  enjoy  instrument 
independence  but  not  goal  independence  (Grilli  et  al.  [1991]  call  these  two  dimensions 
“political  independence”  and  respectively  “economic  independence”).  Indeed,  goal 
independence is clearly the form of independence giving greater autonomy to a central bank. 
But,  Lybek  (2004)  and  Blinder  (1998)  bring  interrogation  to  the  justification  to  give  the 
central  bank  such  authority  because  governors,  who  are  not  elected  by  citizens  directly, 
should  have  the  power  to  decide  the  short-term  trade-off  between  inflation  and 
unemployment. On the contrary, we think that the fight against inflation must be seen as an 
inestimable public good and not as the simple counterpart of unemployment, particularly in 
developing economies where inflation affects primarily poor and vulnerable populations. 
Financial independence refers to the possibility (and to what extent) for a government to 
finance its expenditures by resorting directly or indirectly to advances and loans from central 
bank. Moreover, according to Bassoni and Cartapanis (1995) financial independence allows 
the assessment of the budgetary “breathing space” which central bank disposes, i.e. CBI vis-à-
vis  its  financial  resources  necessary  to  its  functioning.  This  second  aspect  of  financial 
independence can be described as budgetary independence
5.  
The definition of CBI allows us to show the complexity and the pluri-dimensionality of this 
concept and so, the difficulty to measure this independence.  
 
3.  Measures of Central Bank Independence 
The first and main challenge of empirical studies dealing with the relationship between CBI 
and  inflation  is  to  quantify  CBI.  Several  measures  of  CBI  have  been  proposed  in  the 
literature:  de  jure  indexes  (Bade  and  Parkin,  1988;  Bodart,  1990;  Grilli  et  al.,  1991; 
Cukierman et al., 1992; Alesina and Summers, 1993; Eijffinger and Schaling, 1993; Ilieva 
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and Healey, 2001) and, de facto indexes (Cukierman et al., 1992; Cukierman and Webb, 
1995). 
But  as  previously  mentioned,  CBI  is  a  multidimensional  concept  and  so,  defining  and 
constructing  a  relevant  index  is  arduous.  The  difficulty  with  measuring  independence  is 
reinforced by the fact that empirical results are very sensitive to the indicator of CBI used, 
especially when the sample of the study  contains  some “moderately independent”  central 
banks.  Indeed, even though these indicators are similar in general, in the sense that their 
common objective is to measure CBI, they provide quite different outcomes if we compare 
the rank of countries by degree of CBI for the same period. The rank correlation coefficients 
between four legal indexes of CBI calculated by Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) confirm this 
result, with relatively low correlations. According to Mangano (1997), three explanations can 
be given for these diverging outcomes: (i) the components contained in the indicators are 
different because the measures focus on different aspects of CBI; (ii) the interpretation of 
central  bank  status  by  researchers  regarding  each  individual  criterion  differs;  (iii)  the 
indicators  are  differently  weighted  combinations  of  the  same  components.  These  limits 
underline  that  coding  and  measuring  legal  independence  is  an  inherently  arbitrary  and 
subjective process. 
As mentioned in the introduction, this study focuses on two CBI indicators: one de jure, with 
CWN index and, one de facto, with TOR. Construction methodology, advantages and limits 
of these indexes are presented below. 
De jure independence 
The important number of empirical studies using CWN index can be explained by the fact that 
this index of legal independence is the most comprehensive. Certainly, and contrary to other 
CBI indexes, CWN index focuses on the four aspects of CBI outlined in section 2. Moreover, 
this index is “comprehensive in terms of its elements and is relatively easy to replicate since 
the authors provide a thorough guide to coding the various subcomponents”  (Crowe and 
Meade, 2008, p. 765).  
The CWN index is a weighted sum of 16 sub-items which are grouped into the following four 
categories (the number between brackets indicates the number of variables into each cluster): 
organic independence (4) [code: CEO]; monetary policy formulation (3) [code: PF]; monetary 
policy final objectives (1) [code: OBJ]; limitations of lending to government (8) [code: LL]. 8 
 
In comparison to alternative CBI measures developed in the literature that only permit yes/no 
decisions for each criterion, the major evolution brought by the CWN index is that it widens 
considerably the range of responses, in the sense that a score between 0 (smallest level of 
independence) and 1 (highest level of independence) is given to each of the 16 variables. For 
example, there are five possible ratings for the question concerning the term of the mandate: 1 
(if the central bank governor serves > 8 year term), 0.75 (6-8 year term), 0.5 (5 year term), 
0.25 (4 year term) or 0 (under 4 year term). Moreover, Cukierman et al. (1992) include a 
weighting system in their indicator aiming to give a different weight to each component and 
so implicitly, a different weight to each of the four aspects of independence. The weighting 
system is the following: CEO (0.20 % of index), PF (0.15%), OBJ (0.15%) and, LL (0.50%). 
This codification and weighting system certainly permits a more fine analysis and measure of 
CBI but gives also a more important place to arbitrary and subjectivity. Finally, the “overall 
index” for each central  bank is  obtained by  calculating  a weighted arithmetic average of 
variables
6. 
De facto independence 
The  concept  of  actual  independence  includes  many  aspects,  such  as  the  turnover  rate  of 
central bankers, their personality and charisma and also the design of fiscal and monetary 
policies (Radzyner and Riesinger, 1997). To identify the differences between de jure and de 
facto CBI, Cukierman  et  al.  (1992) and Cukierman and Webb (1995)  use three nonlegal 
measures  of  CBI
7. This paper restricts the analysis of real CBI to TOR because many 
empirical studies have proven that TOR is a good proxy to assess actual CBI in particular for 
developing countries and, data are easily available (via notably central bank websites).   
TOR is defined as the average term of office of central bankers. It is calculated by dividing 
the number of central bank governors during a given period by the number of year s of this 
reference period. Thus, for example, a TOR equal to 0.5 means that there ha s been a change 
of governor every two years (0.5 change per year). So, this indicator takes into account the 
potential deviations from the law concerning the term of office of the central bank governor. 
To prove the pertinence of this index as a proxy of actual CBI, Cukierman et al. (1992) give 
the example of Argentina, where an informal tradition  wants  that the governor of  Banco 
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Central de la Republica Argentina resigns whenever there is a change of government, or even 
a new finance minister, even though the legal term of the central banker office is four years. 
Consequently, during 1950-89, the real term of office of Argentina central bank governors is 
less than one year (TOR = 0.93). Through this example, we comprehend the intuition of this 
index:  a  high  turnover  of  central  bankers  indicates  a  low  level  of  independence  because 
monetary  authority  executive  directors  are  subject  to  electoral  and  political  cycles  which 
means they are under government’s influence when conducting the monetary policy. The term 
of office of central bank governors is therefore a guarantee of CBI vis-à-vis political power, 
especially when it exceeds the average length of electoral cycle of a considered country. Thus, 
as in many countries the average length of this cycle is four years, Cukierman et al. (1992) 
consider that a TOR superior to 0.25 is synonymous with low CBI. Nevertheless, Mas (1994) 
expresses a limit about the use of this index as proxy of real CBI: a long term in office may 
also  indicate  a  low  level  of  independence,  because  a  subservient  governor  can  hold  his 
position for a long period of time and survive to several governments despite his lack of 
independence.  
Despite their apparent limits, these two CBI indexes are very used by the empirical literature. 
So, in this study, we decide to retain these indicators to assess the influence of CBI on budget 
deficits in developing countries.   
 
4.  Econometric Strategy and Data 
To estimate the influence of CBI on budget surpluses during the period of 1995-2004, we use 
a panel data analysis. The sample includes all developing countries for which we have the 
required data (see Appendix B). 
The estimated equation is therefore 
CGPBS𝑖𝑡 = ?0 + β1 CBI𝑖 + β2 LRGDP 𝑖𝑡 + β3 GRGDP 𝑖𝑡 + β4 URB𝑖𝑡 + β5 AGRI𝑖𝑡 + β6 ILLY 𝑖𝑡
+ β7 OPEN𝑖𝑡 + γ1 RD𝑖 + γ2 CU𝑖 + μit                           (1)                                         
μit = ?𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i denotes the country and t denotes the time, αi is an unobserved country-specific effect, 
εit is the error term, and the variables are defined as follows: 10 
 
CGPBSit denotes the central government primary budget surplus (as a percentage of GDP), 
CBIi is the central bank independence measured by the two subindexes of CBI previously 
described (CWN and TOR), 
LRGDPit is the log of real per capita GDP, 
GRGDPit is the real GDP annual growth rate, 
URBit is the degree of urbanization, 
AGRIit is the share of agriculture in the GDP, 
ILLYit is the ratio of liquid liabilities of the financial system to GDP, 
OPENit is the trade openness, 
RDi corresponds to regional dummies, 
CUi is a binary variable equal to 1 if the country i is a member of a currency union and 0 
otherwise. 
We are interested in the β1 coefficient, which is the effect of CBI on primary budget surplus. 
The main advantage of our econometric analysis compared to the previous empirical studies is 
the use of panel data technique to estimate the relationship between the degree of CBI and the 
budget deficit. However, for the period under consideration, the time variation of our CBI 
indicators is limited or even null for TOR. Thus, we cannot use fixed effects methodology 
because it removes the variables with not intra-individual variability, like in the case of CBI 
indexes and dummies
8. Concerning the random effects model, the generalized least squares 
(GLS) estimator is consistent and efficient only under the assumption that the explanatory 
variables are not correlated with specific effects. If this assumptio n is not verified, the GLS 
estimator is biased and inconsistent. According to Mundlak (1978), the probability of no 
correlation between individual specific effects and some explanatory variables is low. But, in 
the presence of time-invariant variables, the usual test of Hausman (1978) consisting in the 
comparison of the within and between estimators cannot be used because the test concerns 
only variables with intra-individual variability (Sevestre, 2002). 
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To resolve this potential endogeneity bias specific to panel data econometrics, Hausman and 
Taylor (1981) (hereafter HT) developed “an estimator that is, in essence, a hybrid of the fixed 
effects and generalized least squares (random effects) models” (Gardner, 1998, pp. 39-40). 
This alternative methodology rests upon the method of instrumental variables but, offers the 
advantage  of  using  internal  instruments  and  so,  doesn’t  require  finding  valid  instruments 
outside the model. For that, HT makes a classification of explanatory variables according to 
their endogenous or exogenous character, i.e. correlated or not correlated with unit specific 
effects, and according to the variables are time-variant or time-invariant. Thus, four sets of 
right-hand-side variables are distinguished: X1, X2, Z1 and Z2 where X1 is n*k1, X2 is n*k2, 
Z1 is n*g1, Z2 is n*g2 and, n = N*T. X1 and Z1 are doubly exogenous i.e. they are not 
correlated with unit specific effects and idiosyncratic error, while X2 and Z2 are endogenous 
because they are correlated with specific effects but uncorrelated with the error term. The set 
of variables X (X1, X2) contains variables with intra-individual variability, while the group of 
variables Z (Z1, Z2) comprises variables with no intra-individual variability. So, from this 
classification, the presence of X2 and Z2 is the cause of bias in the random-effects estimator 
and these variables must then be instrumented. As emphasized previously, the originality of 
HT’s methodology is to use information already contained in the model to instrument the 
variables X2 and Z2. The matrix of instruments suggested by HT is as follows: [QX1, QX2, 
PX1, Z1] where Q is a projection matrix which transforms a vector of observations into a 
vector of deviations from group means and, P transforms a vector of observations into a 
vector  of  group  means.  The  order  condition  for  identification  is  that  the  number  of  X1 
variables must be larger or equal than the number of Z2 variables (k1 ≥ g2). The principal 
limit of the strategy proposed by HT is that the decision on which variables are treated as 
exogenous/endogenous is not obvious and, HT suggest mainly using economic intuition
9. In 
this paper, we assume that the variable of GDP per capita is endogenous, i.e. correlated with 
specific effects, and so we include this variable in X2. In fact, we can think that this variable 
is linked to unobservable characteristics of countries as for example the historical past, the 
dominant religion or the culture. 
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Hausman test suggests that the non-instrumented regression is more appropriate. So, variables instrumented can 
be considered as endogenous and the remaining explanatory variables exogenous vis-à-vis individual specific 
effects. But, this  methodology cannot be used  when  the  model contains time-invariant variables or dummy 
variables because these variables are eliminated by the within transformation. 12 
 
The HT estimator was firstly used in labour economics to assess the returns to schooling (see 
for  example  Cornwell  and  Rupert,  1988;  Baltagi  and  Khanti-Akom,  1990;  Guillotin  and 
Sevestre, 1994), because the unobserved individual ability (specific effects) may be correlated 
with  education.  More  recently,  this  method  enjoys  a  great  popularity  in  international 
economics empirical literature using gravity models owing to many determinants of bilateral 
trade  that  are  time  invariant  such  as  the  distance  or  the  common  language  between  two 
countries (see for example Lochard, 2005; Carrère, 2006). 
As part of our study, the interest of using the methodology developed by HT appears clearly. 
It enables to apply a Hausman procedure for testing the joint exogeneity hypothesis of the 
whole  explanatory  variables  (time-variant  and  time-invariant)  in  order  to  determine  the 
appropriate model between random effects and HT estimators from the perspective of policy 
implications
10.  Thus,  under  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  correlation  between  unobserved 
heterogeneity and observable explanatory variables, the random effects estimator and the HT 
estimator  are  bot h  consistent,  but  the  random  effects  estimator  is  efficient.  Under  the 
alternative hypothesis, only the HT estimator is consistent and unbiased.  
The Data 
The dependent variable is the central government primary budget surplus in percent of GDP 
(CGPBS)  and  is  taken  from  Brun  et  al.  (2007).  This  measure  of  budget  surplus,  which 
excludes net interest payments by the treasury, is probably the most appropriate measure of 
fiscal  discipline  because  it  assesses  the  orientation  of  fiscal  policy  over  the  fiscal  year. 
Furthermore, from an econometric point of view, this measure allows us to avoid a potential 
simultaneity  bias  between  the  dependent  variable  and  the  principal  explanatory  variable. 
Indeed, the greater the government influences the monetary authority to monetize deficits, the 
smaller is the degree of CBI. Thus, if we use the conventional budget balance (which includes 
public debt interest payments) as an indicator of fiscal stance, a potential endogeneity bias 
may exist.   
The principal explanatory variable is the degree of CBI measured by the two de jure and de 
facto indicators previously defined. CWN index is given by Crowe and Meade (2008), who 
compute an updated CWN index for a large set of countries using the International Monetary 
                                                           
10 The Hausman test comparing  random effects and HT estimators is as follows: H0 : difference in coefficients 
not systematic.  . H0 is rejected and the random effects 
estimator is inconsistent if QH > χ
2
r (r denotes the degrees of freedom).   13 
 
Fund’s  Central  Bank  Law  Database
11.  Concerning  TOR,  the  authors  constructed  the  data 
based on central bank websites and central bank survey. The degree of CBI is expected to 
have a positive effect on budget surplus when it is measured by CWN index. Conversely, we 
expect TOR to have a negative effect on budget surplus.  
We include three regional dummies, RDi: AFRICA for Sub-Saharan Africa, EASIAP for East 
Asia and Pacific, and  LATINCA for  Latin America  and the Caribbean. The inclusion of 
regional  dummies  allows  the  control  of  structural  characteristics  related  to  geographical 
location but not to sociopolitical and institutional factors (Woo, 2003).  
In  addition  to  regional  dummies,  we  include  other  control  variables  mentioned  by  many 
empirical  studies  on the determinants  of public deficits.  The determinants  of the primary 
budget balance are on one hand, the capability of a country to mobilize public resources and, 
on the other hand, the country’s allocative efficiency of these resources.  
The  log  of  real  GDP  per  capita  (LRGDP)  is  introduced  in  the  regression  to  capture  the 
differences in the level of economic development between countries. Indeed, although the 
sample of countries includes only developing market economies, some studies show a relative 
heterogeneity concerning the level of development of fiscal administrations in developing 
countries and, therefore, these countries have unequal capabilities to mobilize fiscal resources. 
More  developed  countries,  i.e.  countries  with  a  relatively  high  level  of  fiscal  transition, 
probably have a greater ability to design efficient fiscal systems. So, a higher income per 
capita reflecting a higher level of development is held to indicate a greater capacity to levy 
and collect taxes (Chelliah, 1971). This is true concerning the management and the efficiency 
of public expenditures.  Moreover, according to Roubini (1991), the GDP  per  capita may 
capture some sociopolitical effects if social conflicts are more important in poor countries. 
The sign of GDP per capita is expected to be positive. 
The real  GDP annual  growth rate (GRGDP) is  included in  the regression  as  a proxy for 
economic activity because government budget balance is sensitive to economic fluctuations. 
Indeed, when the level of economic activity is low or moderate, the amount of tax revenues 
collected by the  government decreases  while social expenditures  increase, that leads  to  a 
deterioration  of  budget  balance.  Conversely,  a  higher  economic  growth  generates  an 
improvement in the budget balance (automatic stabilizers). Thus, the sign of the coefficient of 
                                                           
11 We would like to thank Christopher Crowe for providing us with the data. 14 
 
GRGDP is expected to be positive. However, some authors (see for example Talvi and Végh, 
2000) have suggested that fiscal policy can be procyclical in developing countries with weak 
governments, because political pressures to increase public spending go hand in hand with the 
growing tax revenue due to higher economic growth. The strong increase in fiscal demands 
during economic boom is called “voracity effect” (Lane and Tornell, 1999). Thus, according 
to Woo (2003), the sign of the coefficient of GRGDP is an empirical question. 
Concerning the urban population ratio (URB), this variable is introduced in the model because 
Edwards  and  Tabellini  (1991)  show  that  it  is  relatively  easier  and  less  costly  for  tax 
authorities to collect taxes in urban areas with higher concentration of the formal sector than 
in rural areas, where the degree of tax evasion and avoidance is particularly high (Ansari, 
1982). We then expect URB to have a positive sign. 
Furthermore, according to Tanzi (1992), the country’s economic structure is an important 
factor that could influence the level of taxation. For this reason, the share of agriculture in 
GDP (AGRI) is included. Nevertheless, the expected sign of AGRI is uncertain because the 
theory distinguishes two opposite effects of the share of agriculture in GDP on the tax share. 
Thus, on the supply side, the share of agriculture in GDP is expected to have a negative effect 
on tax revenues because political constraints could encourage the government to cut taxation 
in  this  sector,  often  heavily  taxed  in  many  implicit  ways  through  import  quotas,  tariffs, 
controlled prices for output, or overvalued exchange rates (Bird, 1979; Ahmad and Stern, 
1991;  Tanzi,  1992).  Moreover,  agricultural  sector  in  developing  countries  is  mainly 
characterized  by  subsistence  farming  and  the  predominance  of  small  farmers  and  so,  it 
appears difficult for a government to tax the main foods that are used for subsistence (Stotsky 
and WoldeMariam, 1997). Conversely, on the demand side, the share of agriculture in GDP is 
expected to have a positive effect on budget surplus because many public sector activities 
being city-oriented, the demand for public goods and services and so the public expenditures 
are theoretically reduced (Teera, 2003). 
Woo (2003) includes the ratio of liquid liabilities (M3) of the financial system to GDP (ILLY) 
as  a  proxy  for  the  financial  market  development  level,  the  so-called  “financial  depth”. 
According to this author, “countries with highly developed financial markets can more easily 
finance the fiscal deficit by issuing bonds without having to resort to inflationary finance” 
(Woo, 2003, p. 393). Thus, the sign of the coefficient of ILLY is expected to be negative. 15 
 
The trade openness (OPEN) is here measured by the ratio of the sum of exports and imports 
of goods and services to GDP. This variable assesses the intensity of the national economy’s 
integration  into  world  trade  and,  to  a  certain  degree,  the  dependence  of  an  economy  on 
international conjuncture and its sensitivity to changes in international prices. Above all, the 
trade openness enables the assessment of the relative strength of the external constraint to 
which  the  economy  is  submitted  and  partly  determines  the  political  economy  “breathing 
space”, especially concerning fiscal policy (Blancheton, 2004). Consequently, a country with 
a relatively high degree of trade openness theoretically may be more vulnerable to external 
shocks.  This  increase  of  vulnerability  is  not  without  consequence  on  government  budget 
balance.  However,  Combes  and  Saadi-Sedik  (2006)  emphasize  the  contradictory  results 
concerning the effect of trade openness on budget balances in the studies that included this 
proxy of external vulnerability as a control variable for budget deficits. Moreover, although 
this measure of trade openness is widely used in empirical literature, it is has been criticized 
by some economists
12. Thus, the expected sign of the coefficient of OPEN is uncertain. 
Finally, we introduce in the model a currency union dummy (CU) which takes the value of 
one if the country is a member of a currency union, or zero otherwise. In our sample, 
accession to currency union concerns fourteen African countries, each affiliated with one of 
the two monetary unions of the CFA Franc Zone: the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU) and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC)
13. 
The sign of the coefficient of CU is ex pected to be positive. Indeed theoretically, these 
countries must respect a set convergence criteria pertaining notably to public finances, the key 
criterion being the ratio of the basic fiscal balance
14 to nominal GDP which must be 0 or 
more. So, we could  expect that these budgetary rules, which constrain politician’s tax and 
spending behavior, have a positive impact on primary budget surplus. 
 
 
                                                           
12 The principal criticisms made for this measure are : (i)  its construction fault (ratio of sales to a sum of value 
added) ; (ii) its double dependence on political (intensity of commercial protections) and structural (population, 
dimension). See Siroën (2000) and Blancheton (2004) for a comprehensive survey. 
13 The eight members of WAEMU are : Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte-d’Ivoire, Guin￩e-Bissau (who joined in May 
1997), Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. The six members of CAEMC are: Cameroon, Central African Rep., 
Chad, Congo Rep., Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. 
14 The basic budget balance is defined as total revenue, excluding grants, minus total expenditures, excluding 
foreign-finance investment. 16 
 
5.  Results 
This section discusses the empirical results for each specification, i.e. for each measure of 
CBI  (de  jure  and  de  facto).  For  each  specification,  we  estimate  the  panel  regression  of 
equation (1) using random effects and HT models. In either case, the Hausman test suggests 
that  the  non-instrumented  regression  is  more  appropriate.  Nevertheless,  to  show  the 
robustness  of  our  results,  we  present  the  HT  model  and  random  effects  panel  regression 
results using the same specification. We then compare the results of the two models.  
 
Table 1 : The influence of de jure independence (CWN index) on budget surplus  
The dependent 
variable is primary 







































































































































































Observations  508  508  508  499  494  493  493  493 
Nb. of countries  56  56  56  55  55  55  55  55 
R
2  0.32  0.31  0.32  0.33  0.35  0.35  0.35  − 
Hausman Test                6.64 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. Columns (1) to (7) present the random effects (RE) estimates. 
Column (8) reports the estimate with Hausman Taylor (HT) estimator. Levels of significance are indicated by 
asterisks:
  ***1%, 
**5%, 
*10%.  Variables  X1:  GRGDP,  URB,  AGRI,  ILLY,  OPEN;  Z1:  EASIA,  LATINCA, 
AFRICA, CWN, CU; X2: LRGDP.  
 
Table 1 shows the results of the influence of legal CBI on primary budget surplus. As stressed 
by the economic literature on CBI, the estimated coefficient of CWN is insignificant at the 17 
 
conventional level. Thus, this result confirms that a legal approach is not fit for developing 
countries,  characterized by weak institutions  which deviate from  the law.  Concerning the 
control variables, the estimated coefficients of LRGDP and ILLY are statistically significant 
and have the expected sign. URB has the expected sign with random effects and the wrong 
sign with HT model but is not significant. The estimated coefficient of AGRI has a positive 
sign but is insignificant. OPEN has a positive sign and is significant at the 5 percent level with 
HT methodology. The sign of the coefficient CU is insignificant in both the models. This last 
result could be nevertheless explained by the fact that few WAEMU and CAEMC countries 
have satisfied convergence criteria
15. Concerning the coefficients on the regional dummies, 
they are insignificant for Sub-Saharan African and Latin American and Caribbean countries, 
but are globally significant for East Asian and Pacific countries at the conventional level, 
reflecting the fact that most of the countries of this region have run higher primary budget 
deficits than other developing countries. 
                                                           
15 See annual reports drafted by the WAEMU and the CAEMC Commissions for more details.  18 
 
Table 2 : The influence of de facto independence (TOR) on budget surplus 
The dependent 
variable is primary 







































































































































































Observations  707  707  707  696  696  694  694  694 
Nb. of countries  77    77  77  76  76  76  76  76 
R
2  0.29  0.29  0.29  0.3  0.34  0.33  0.33  − 
Hausman Test                8.71 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. Columns (1) to (7) present the random effects (RE) estimates. 
Column (8) reports the estimate with Hausman Taylor (HT) estimator. Levels of significance are indicated by 
asterisks:
  ***1%, 
**5%, 
*10%.  Variables  X1:  GRGDP,  URB,  AGRI,  ILLY,  OPEN;  Z1:  EASIA,  LATINCA, 
AFRICA, TOR, CU; X2: LRGDP.  
 
Table 2 reports the results of the influence of actual CBI on budget surplus. The coefficient of 
TOR appears with the expected sign and is significant at the 1 or 5 percent level. This result 
means that the turnover rate of central bank governors is negatively associated with primary 
budget surplus. It suggests that the greater the independence of a country’s central bank, the 
lower is its budget deficit and so, confirms the theoretical predictions which suppose that CBI 
is  a  key  determinant  of  budget  deficits.  We  can  see  that  results  are  robust  to  various 
econometric  specifications  in  terms  of  statistically  significance  and  size  of  coefficients. 
Moreover, while the Hausman test suggests the random effects model to be the preferred 
specification, we see that there are very few differences between random effects and HT 
models, which lead to very similar coefficients and statistically significance levels. So, our 
results are not sensitive to the estimation technique and show the robustness of the relation 19 
 
between CBI and budget deficits. Concerning the control variables, results are similar to table 
1 and confirm that LRGDP and ILLY are robust determinants with CBI of budgets deficits in 
developing countries. Finally, coefficients on the regional dummies are uniformly negative 
and largely insignificant. Only EASIA is significant in the complete random effects model 
(column 7) at the 10 percent level.  
 
6.  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Theoretical literature argued that CBI should affect the design of fiscal policy, in the sense 
that a higher independence is associated with lower budget deficits. Nevertheless, the few 
empirical studies which have sought to econometrically assess this relationship were mainly 
focused on developed countries, and have found insignificant results. So, using two indicators 
measuring de jure and de facto CBI, this paper aims to re-examine the effect of CBI on 
budget  deficits  in  a  large  sample  of  developing  countries  over  the  1995-2004  period 
employing a panel data analysis. 
Our  empirical  results  suggest  that  a  significant  negative  relation  exists between  CBI  and 
primary budget  deficits  in  developing countries. These results  are in  accordance with  the 
theoretical literature and mean that, ceteris paribus, a country with a weak independent central 
bank tends to have higher primary budget deficits. Moreover, we find that the difference 
between de jure and de facto independence is relevant in developing countries, because actual 
CBI evaluated by TOR is statistically significant whereas legal CBI measured by CWN index 
appears insignificant. 
The policy implications of these results are clear: CBI must be promoted and consolidated in 
developing countries in order to exert a disciplining influence on political decision makers 
who improve fiscal policies. Thus, more disciplined fiscal policies should enable to avoid debt 
crisis, such as those that have been observed in developing countries prior the adoption of the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) by international financial institutions in June 2005. 
In addition to the increase of CBI, developing countries should also implement structural 
reforms to define sound budgetary institutions and efficient fiscal administrations. 20 
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Appendix A. Empirical studies on the relationship between CBI and budget deficits  
Study  Countries  Period  CBI index  Relation between CBI and 
budget deficits 




1970-85  -  Negative (not statistically 
measured) 
Burdekin and Laney (1988)  12 OECD countries  1960-83 and 
sub-periods 
Dummy variable  Negative, significant 
Grilli et al. (1991)  18 OECD countries  1950-89 and 
sub-periods 
GMT  Negative, insignificant 
De Haan and Sturm (1992)  18 OECD countries  1961-87 and 
sub-periods 
5 de jure CBI indexes  Negative, significance 
depends on CBI measure 





20 OECD countries  1978-92  CWN, GMT  Negative (not 
econometrically assessed) 





*, TOR  Ambiguous, insignificant 
*  LL  is  an  indicator  disaggregated  from  CWN  index  and  corresponds  to  the  limitations  on  lending  to 
government. 
Appendix B. List of countries in the sample 
Algeria
*  Congo, Dem. Rep.
#  India  Nigeria 
Angola
*  Congo, Rép.  Indonesia  Pakistan 
Argentina  Costa Rica  Jamaica  Peru 
Bahamas, The  Côte d'Ivoire  Jordan
*  Philippines 
Bangladesh
*  Djibouti
*  Kenya  Rwanda
* 
Barbados  Dominican Rep.
*  Kuwait  Senegal 
Belize
*  Egypt, Arab Rep.  Lebanon  Seychelles
* 
Benin  El Salvador  Lesotho
*  South Africa 
Bolivia  Equatorial Guinea  Madagascar
*  Sri Lanka 




*  Malaysia  Swaziland
* 
Burkina Faso  Gabon  Mali  Tanzania 
Burundi
*  Gambia, The
*  Mauritius
*  Thailand 
Cameroon  Ghana  Mexico  Togo 
Cape Verde
*  Guatemala  Morocco  Tunisia 
Central African Rep.  Guinea
*  Mozambique
*  Uganda 
Chad  Guinea-Bissau  Namibia  Uruguay 
Chile  Haiti
*  Nepal  Venezuela 
Colombia  Honduras  Nicaragua  Zambia 
      Niger  Zimbabwe 
* Indicates that data on CWN are not available / # Indicates that data on TOR are not available 26 
 
Appendix C. Data description and source 
Variables  Description and sources 
AFRICA  Dummy  variable  for  Sub-Saharan  African  countries  (according  to  the  World  Bank  country 
classification). 
AGRI  Share of the  value added of agriculture sector in GDP. Agriculture includes foresty, hunting and 
fishing,  as  well  as  cultivation  of  crops  and  livestock  production.  Source:  World  Development 
Indicators (2008). 
CGPBS  Central government primary budget surplus (% of GDP). Source: Brun et al. (2007). 
CU  Dummy  variable  for  currency  union:  1  if  the  country  is  a  member  of  a  currency  union  and  0 
otherwise. 
CWN  De jure central bank independence measured by the Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti index over 1995-
2004. Source: Crowe and Meade (2008).  
EASIAP  Dummy  variable  for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  countries  (according  to  the  World  Bank  country 
classification). 
GRGDP  Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency. Source: World 
Development Indicators (2008). 
ILLY  Financial depth: the ratio of liquid liabilities (M3) of the financial system to GDP. Liquid liabilities 
are  the  sum  of  currency  and  deposits  in  the  central  bank  (M0),  plus  transferable  deposits  and 
electronic  currency  (M1),  plus  time  and  savings  deposits,  foreign  currency  transferable  deposits, 
certificates  of  deposit,  and  securities  repurchase  agreements  (M2),  plus  travelers  checks,  foreign 
currency  time  deposits,  commercial  paper,  and  shares  of  mutual  funds  or  market  funds  held  by 
residents. Source: World Development Indicators (2008). 
LATINCA  Dummy variable for Latin America and Caribbean countries (according to the World Bank country 
classification).  
LRGDP  Log of GDP per capita in constant 2000 U.S. dollars. Source: World Development Indicators (2008). 
OPEN  Trade openess is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of GDP. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2008). 
TOR  De facto central bank independence measured by the turnover rate of central bank governors over 
1995-2004. Source: Author's calculation based on central bank websites and central bank survey. 
URB  Urban population (% of total). Source: World Development Indicators (2008). 
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Appendix D. Construction of the CWN Index 
Description of variables  Variables  Weight  Score 
 
1/ Executive independence  
 
a) Length of governor’s term of office 
-  ≥ 8 years 
-  Between 6 and 8 years 
-  5 years 
-  4 years 
-      < 4 years or at the discretion of appointer 
b)  Who appoints the governor? 
-  Appointed by the board of the central bank  
-  Appointed by a board composed of members of executive branch, parliament, 
and the board of the central bank 
-  Appointed by the legislative branch 
-  Appointed by the executive branch 
-  Appointed by one or two members of the executive branch 
c) Dismissal of governor                       
-   No provision for dismissal 
-   Only for reasons not related to monetary policy 
-   At the discretion of the central bank board 
-   At legislative branch’s discretion for reasons related to monetary policy  
-   Unconditional dismissal possible by the legislative branch 
-   At executive branch’s discretion for reasons related to monetary policy 
-   Unconditional dismissal possible by the executive branch 
d) Possibility for governor to hold government office 
-  Governor prohibited by law from holding government office 
-  Prohibited unless authorized by the government 
-  No prohibitions of law in this matter 
 
2/ Monetary policy formulation 
 
a) Who formulates monetary policy?  
-   Central bank alone has this authority 
-   Authority is shared by government and central bank 
-   Central bank has advisory role in setting policy 
-   Only government has this power 
b) Government directives and conflict resolution  
-  Central bank has final authority on matters explicitly defined by law as its 
objectives  
-  Government has ultimate authority only on policy matters not explicitly defined 
as objectives of the central bank, or in the event of internal conflict within the 
central bank 
-  In case of conflict, the final decision lies with a body comprising members of 
the central bank, the legislative branch, and the executive branch 
-  Legislative branch has final authority in policy matters 
-  Executive branch has final authority in policy matters, but is subject to possible 
opposition by the central bank 
-  Executive branch has unconditional final authority 
c) Does central bank has advisory role in formulating government budget? 
-  Central bank plays an active role 
-  Central bank has no influence 
 
3/ Objectives of the central bank 
-  Price stability is the sole/main objective; takes precedence if conflict with other 
government objectives (e.g. full employment, economic growth) 
-  Price stability is the only objective 
-  Price stability is mentioned together with other objectives that do not conflict 
with it  
-  Price stability mentioned together with other objectives that may potentially 
conflict with it 
-  Central bank law does not include objectives of this type 
































































































































































































































4/ Limitations on lending to the government                                                                                          
 
a) Limitations on advances 
-  Advance lending to the government is prohibited 
-  Advances  are  possible    with  strict  limits  (e.g.  up  to  15%  of  government 
revenue) 
-  Advances  are  possible  but  subject to  more  accommodating  limitations (e.g. 
over 15% of government revenue)  
-  No legal limitations on advances; amount is periodically negotiated between 
the central bank and the government 
b) Limitations on guaranteed loans to the government 
Same distinctions as for Lla  
c) Who has authority to control terms and conditions of loans to the government? 
-  Central bank 
-  Terms and conditions specified by the central bank law 
-  Terms and conditions agreed between the central bank and the executive branch 
-  Terms and conditions decided by the executive branch alone 
d) Who has access to loans granted by the central bank? 
-  Only the central government 
-  All levels of government  
-  All levels of government and public enterprises 
-  Public and private sector  
e) Types of limitations on loans, where limits exist 
-  Limit on loan amount is prescribed in absolute terms 
-  Limit on loan amount is prescribed in terms of capital or other liabilities of the 
central bank 
-  Limit on loan amount is prescribed in terms of percentage of government’s 
revenues  
-  Limit on loan amount is prescribed in terms of percentage of government’s 
expenditures 
f) Maturity of possible loans 
-  < 6 months 
-  < 1 year 
-  > 1 year 
-  No legal limit on maturity of loan 
g) Limitations on interest rates applicable to loan by central bank 
-  Loan is possible only at market rates 
-  Minimum level applies to interest rates paid by the government 
-  Ceiling applies to interest rates paid by the government 
-  No explicit legal provisions on interest applied to loans by the central bank 
-  Law does not provide for the government to pay interest on loans from the 
central bank 
h) Prohibitions on lending on the primary market 
-  Central bank prohibited from underwriting public debt securities on the primary 
market 































































































































































Source: Cukierman et al. (1992) and Arnone et al. (2007) 29 
 
Appendix E. Central Bank Independence: CWN Scores and TOR (1995-2004)  
   CWN  TOR     CWN  TOR 
Algeria  -  0.2  Indonesia  0.84  0.3 
Angola  -  0.5  Jamaica  0.42  0.2 
Argentina  0.79  0.6  Jordan  -  0.3 
Bahamas, The  0.4  0.2  Kenya  0.48  0.3 
Bangladesh  -  0.4  Kuwait  0.41  0.1 
Barbados  0.41  0.3  Lebanon  0.46  0.1 
Belize  -  0.3  Lesotho  -  0.3 
Benin  0.49  0.1  Madagascar  -  0.2 
Bolivia  0.78  0.2  Malawi  -  0.3 
Botswana  0.52  0.3  Malaysia  0.47  0.3 
Brazil  0.46  0.5  Mali  0.49  0.1 
Burkina Faso  0.49  0.1  Mauritius  -  0.3 
Burundi  -  0.3  Mexico  0.64  0.2 
Cameroon  0.6  0.1  Morocco  0.31  0.2 
Cape Verde  -  0.3  Mozambique  -  0.1 
Central African Rep.  0.6  0.1  Namibia  0.43  0.2 
Chad  0.6  0.1  Nepal  0.67  0.3 
Chile  0.79  0.3  Nicaragua  0.79  0.3 
Colombia  0.69  0.1  Niger  0.49  0.1 
Congo. Dem. Rep  0.59  -  Nigeria  0.53  0.3 
Congo. Rep.  0.6  0.1  Pakistan  0.38  0.2 
Costa Rica  0.73  0.3  Peru  0.89  0.3 
Côte d'Ivoire  0.49  0.1  Philippines  0.74  0.2 
Djibouti  -  0.1  Rwanda  -  0.3 
Dominican Rep.  -  0.4  Senegal  0.49  0.1 
Egypt. Arab Rep.  0.47  0.3  Seychelles  -  0.3 
El Salvador  0.73  0.4  South Africa  0.48  0.2 
Equatorial Guinea  0.6  0.1  Sri Lanka  0.5  0.3 
Ethiopia  0.43  0.3  Sudan  -  0.3 
Fiji  -  0.3  Swaziland  -  0.2 
Gabon  0.6  0.1  Tanzania  0.53  0.2 
Gambia, The  -  0.2  Thailand  0.21  0.5 
Ghana  0.56  0.3  Togo  0.49  0.1 
Guatemala  0.78  0.3  Tunisia  0.51  0.3 
Guinea  -  0.3  Uganda  0.52  0.2 
Guinea-Bissau  0.49  0.1  Uruguay  0.43  0.5 
Haiti  -  0.4  Venezuela  0.8  0.2 
Honduras  0.67  0.4  Zambia  0.51  0.3 
India  0.28  0.3  Zimbabwe  0.52  0.2 30 
 
Appendix F1. Summary statistics 
Variables  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
CWN  56  0.55  0.15  0.21  0.89 
TOR  77  0.25  0.12  0.1  0.6 
CGPBS  78  0.28  5.55  -22.9  36.3 
RGDP  78  2044.76  2978.01  81.01  19551.13 
GRGDP  78  4.08  5.78  -28.09  71.19 
URB  78  46.26  22.51  7.3  98.28 
AGRI   77  20.88  14.49  0.36  62.38 
ILLY  78  42.19  30.01  2.07  219.92 
OPEN  77  73.95  40.09  14.93  275.23 
 
 
Appendix F2. Correlation matrix of variables 
   CWN  TOR  CGPBS  RGDP  GRGDP  URB  AGRI  ILLY  OPEN 
CWN  1.00 
                TOR  0.04  1.00 
              CGPBS  -0.04  -0.11  1.00 
            RGDP  0.12  0.32  0.32  1.00 
          GRGDP  -0.01  -0.12  0.06  0.01  1.00 
        URB  0.42  0.29  0.25  0.71  -0.13  1.00 
      AGRI  -0.17  -0.38  -0.27  -0.65  0.03  -0.72  1.00 
    ILLY  -0.34  0.28  -0.01  0.28  -0.10  0.21  -0.34  1.00 











Appendix G1. Central Bank Independence level and fiscal discipline on average over the 
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Appendix G2. Central Bank Independence level and fiscal discipline on average over the 
1995-2004 period (means comparison) 











[0.2; 0.3 [  2  - 2.87  1.21   0.1  19  1.99  7.04 
[0.3; 0.4 [  2  1.32  2.39   0.2  17  1.54  3.7 
[0.4; 0.5 [  21  2.06  6.84   0.3  31  - 0.35  3.4 
[0.5; 0.6 [  10  0.06  2.69   0.4  5  0.19  0.88 
[0.6; 0.7 [  10  2.75   3.72  0.5  4  - 0.75  4.57 
[0.7; 0.8 [  8  0 .50   2.19  0.6  1  - 3.75  - 
[0.8; 0.9 [  3   - 0.96   5.71             
 
 
 